Abstract
This study examined the methodological challenges involved in assessing how tactical failures shape national security outcomes, highlighting the persistent gap between grand strategic intent and operational reality. According to the findings of the qualitative comparative analysis, these issues were present in the cases of Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Ukraine tied with the loss of intelligence, and was themselves the issues in emerging and growing sets of mechanisms of failures at the tactical levels that shaped the vertical and horizontal chains of inaction at the strategic levels. It was long operational stasis, loss of initiative, and the growing complexity of opponents' response systems that tactical failures disrupted over time. The study also noted key methodological problems, such as lack of data, class restrictions, and methodological measures not being present in the matrices used. These issues were limiting the ability of researchers to examine in a more systemic way the phenomenon of misalignment strategy-tactics at the level of national security. The study emphasized the importance of addressing these tactical level shortfalls in conjunction with building the right tools of analysis needed in national security to provide realistic frameworks for the attainment of grand strategic aims in complex wars.
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