A Perception Study of Violent Youth Groups and the Political Economy of Security in Rivers State

Dumo-opuye Amakiri Beal; Uchechukwu Onyeukwu

doi:10.56201/ijssmr.vol.12no8.2026.pg167.178

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A Perception Study of Violent Youth Groups and the Political Economy of Security in Rivers State

Dumo-opuye Amakiri Beal and Uchechukwu Onyeukwu

Abstract

The persistence of violent youth groups has become a defining feature of the security landscape in Rivers State. While previous studies have largely attributed youth violence to poverty, unemployment, and weak state institutions, limited attention has been paid to how youths themselves perceive the benefits of violence and how such perceptions contribute to the sustenance of violent groups. This study examined violent youth groups and the political economy of security in Rivers State from a perception perspective. The study was anchored on the Marxian Political Economy and Rational Choice theories, which explain youth violence as both a product of structural socio-economic inequalities and a rational response to perceived costs and benefits within the prevailing political environment. A mixed-methods research design was adopted. Primary data were generated through a structured questionnaire administered to respondents across selected communities in Rivers State, and key informant interviews were conducted with purposively selected participants. Quantitative data were analysed using simple percentages, while qualitative data were subjected to content analysis. The findings revealed that many youths perceive violence as a pathway to economic opportunities, political relevance, social recognition, and access to state and community resources. The study further established that political patronage, unemployment, poverty, and the legitimisation of individuals with violent backgrounds have reinforced the persistence of violent youth groups, thereby undermining security and democratic governance in the state. The study concludes that the persistence of violent youth groups is sustained by the interaction between structural socio-economic deprivation and incentive structures that reward violent engagement. It recommends the elimination of political patronage of violent groups, expansion of youth employment and skills development programmes, implementation of structural reforms that reshape youth incentives towards legitimate livelihoods, and the discontinuation of traditional titles, political appointments, and community leadership positions for individuals with known histories of violence. These measures are essential for promoting sustainable peace and strengthening the political economy of security in Rivers State.

Keywords

Violent Youth GroupsPolitical EconomySecurityPerception

References

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A Perception Study of Violent Youth Groups and the Political Economy of Security in Rivers State

Abstract

Keywords

References

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