Assessing the Willingness of Manufacturing Enterprises in Vietnam to Participate in the Carbon Credit Market: A Qualitative Study and Game Theory Application

Abstract

This study aims to assess the willingness of manufacturing enterprises in Vietnam to participate in the carbon credit market and to analyze the strategic interactions that shape their decisions in an emerging market context. Applying an explanatory sequential mixed-methods design, the research begins with a qualitative phase involving 18 in-depth interviews with senior managers, then uses these findings to construct and analyze a Game Theory model. The results show that policy ambiguity and the burden of investment costs are the two main barriers, leading to a prevalent 'wait-and-see' mentality. The Game Theory model quantifies this, demonstrating that under the current circumstances, 'Delay' is the sole Nash Equilibrium, creating an 'inaction trap' where individually rational actions by firms collectively lead to market-wide stagnation. Consequently, the study affirms that policy interventions are crucial to break this equilibrium. Key policy implications include the need for the Government to quickly provide a transparent market roadmap, establish clear carbon pricing mechanisms, and implement substantive financial and technical support packages to reduce investment costs and increase the opportunity cost of inaction. The novelty of this research lies in its combination of the depth of qualitative analysis with the systematic logic of Game Theory, providing a multidimensional and insightful perspective on corporate strategic behavior in an emerging market, thereby not only filling a research gap in Vietnam but also offering a useful analytical framework for policymakers.

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