Public Sector Corruption and Accountability in Anambra State Ministry of Education, 2015–2025

Abstract

This study examined public sector corruption and accountability in the Anambra State Ministry of Education between 2015 and 2025, focusing specifically on financial misappropriation and favoritism as two dimensions of corruption affecting institutional accountability. The study was anchored on Principal-Agent Theory and Institutional Theory and drew on qualitative evidence from Key Informant Interviews with senior ministry officials, finance, procurement and audit personnel, Focus Group Discussions with school administrators and principals, and documentary materials relating to budgets, audit processes and education governance. The evidence indicates that financial misappropriation operated through procurement leakage, contract inflation, contract fragmentation, incomplete or substandard delivery of educational inputs, weak verification, and discrepancies between approved allocations and actual implementation. These practices weakened accountability because financial decisions were not consistently subjected to effective independent scrutiny. The evidence also shows that favoritism was embedded in procurement and administrative processes, particularly where contracts were repeatedly associated with politically connected entities and where administrative discretion influenced access to opportunities and benefits. The study further demonstrates that weakened internal audit independence, information asymmetry, limited public access to project information, and inadequate monitoring reinforced the conditions under which these practices persisted. The study concludes that corruption within the Ministry during the period was better understood as an institutional and operational governance problem than as isolated individual misconduct. The study recommended that the Anambra State government should institute end-to-end digitalisation of administrative processes, open contracting, stronger internal audit autonomy, improved project monitoring, and institutional mechanisms for protected reporting and accountability.

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