The Politics of Terrorism Financing and Accountability in Nigeria: An Examination of State Capacity, Elite Interests, and Counterterrorism Prosecution

Abstract

This study examines the political economy of terrorism financing and accountability in Nigeria, with particular emphasis on state capacity, elite interests, and counterterrorism prosecution outcomes. It interrogates how institutional arrangements and political dynamics shape the effectiveness of terrorism financing control mechanisms within a complex security environment. Drawing on an integrated theoretical framework combining state capacity theory, elite theory, and accountability perspectives, the study analyzes the operational performance of key institutions, including the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, the Department of State Services, and the judiciary. Findings reveal that Nigeria possesses a formally structured counterterrorism financing architecture; however, its effectiveness is constrained by institutional fragmentation, weak inter-agency coordination, and limited investigative and prosecutorial capacity. The study further finds that elite interests significantly influence enforcement outcomes through political interference, selective prosecution, and informal protection networks, thereby undermining the neutrality of accountability mechanisms. Although enforcement actions such as investigations and arrests are frequently initiated, they rarely translate into consistent convictions, reflecting systemic inefficiencies within the prosecution and adjudication chain. Comparative insights indicate that Nigeria partially aligns with global counterterrorism financing standards but underperforms in implementation, particularly in converting financial intelligence into judicial sanctions. The study concludes that the counterterrorism financing regime in Nigeria functions as a politically mediated enforcement system in which formal institutional capacity is constrained by elite bargaining and structural inefficiencies. It recommends strengthening inter-agency coordination, enhancing prosecutorial specialization, improving judicial efficiency, and insulating enforcement institutions from political interference.

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