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Violent Conflict, Foreign Interventions and Cycle of Instability in the Gulf States: A Study of Yemen

Chimezie Chukwuemeka Eze

Abstract

This article interrogated violent conflict, foreign intervention and the cycle of instability in the Gulf States with emphasis on Yemen. Violent conflicts have destabilised the Gulf region and have led to the collapse of public institutions that provide healthcare, water, sanitation, and education, exacerbating an already horrible situation. Before the recent conflict, the Republic of Yemen was already the poorest in the Arab region, suffering from weak human development outcomes compounded with high population growth, repeated local conflicts, chronic food insecurity and uncertain political transition. The paper was based on the Collective Security Theory. The principle of Collective Security provides rationality for a range of international organisations such as the UN, AU, NATO and EU, which all attempt to uphold international peace and stability. Collective security is a system where each state in the system accepts that the security of one is the concern of all, and agrees to join in a collective response to threats to peace. The paper applied the qualitative methods of data collection and analysis. It found that the Arab Gulf States have experienced various forms of violent conflicts that have led to instability in the region, and this has led to foreign interventions from key players with vested interests. The study recommended that, in order to end instability in the Gulf States, there should be a compromise among the major powers in the region. [cite_start]The success of any system of international security depends on the strong and united leadership, the spirit of compromise, as well as the decisiveness of its members to hold till the end. [cite: 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895]

Keywords

Violent conflictForeign InterventionsInstabilityGulf States and Yemen

References

Henderson, 2010. Center for Preventive Action, 2025. UN, 2024. Eze (2024). UN, 2022. Congressional Research Service, 2023. Uchechukwu and Eze (2025). Adelman & Govind, 2004. Rabe (2005). Finnemore, 2004. Collier (2008). Alexander (2012). Levin, 2016. Power (2002). Dallaire (2003). UN, 2024. Blomfield, 2011. Imhof (2021). Horace (2013). Gaid (2022). Mack, 2002, cited in Mueller, 2018. Gibbons-Neff & Cooper (2018). Richelieu (1629). Adeb & Uddagatti, 2021. CIA, 2023. World Bank, 2023. Binhuwaidin, 2015. Sevilla, 2011. Bahgat, 2008. Yae, 2004. Klug, 2012. Abdo, 2013. Lyon, 14 February 2013. Assi and Abdulhassan (2020).

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