Constitutional Purposivism as the Vehicle for the Justiciability of the Right to Education in Nigeria

but binding commitments that shape the validity and interpretation of all other laws. Constitutional Purposivism recognizes that the Constitution’s text is not a set of isolated compartments but an integrated design in which directive principles, rights, and structural provisions must be read harmoniously. It is particularly suited to contexts – such as the right to education – where a literal reading would strip the Constitution’s core commitments of their practical effect. 2.2 Purposive Constitutional Interpretation: Method and Rationale The lawmaker does not make a law without an object in mind.17 The purposive approach of constitutional interpretation seeks to understand the draftsman's intention for making a law and to give effect to it.18 It is the duty of the court to find out the object of a statute or a provision in the constitution and render an interpretation that serves that purpose.19 Aptly captured, Solomon reflected that "in interpreting a written constitution, the courts ‘should focus on the document’s broad goals rather than details of the adopted text’... as constitutional purposivism appears to be best suited in maintaining fidelity to the constitution’s original intention."20 The Purposive approach has a global influence.21 In New Zealand, section 5(1) of the Interpretation Act 1999 provides that Acts must be interpreted according to their purpose.22 In Re Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd, the Canadian Supreme Court ruled that "Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their 17 See Halsbury’s Laws of England, Volume 44(1), 4th Reissue, para 1474, pp 906-07 18 Justice G. P. Singh. 2020. Principles of Statutory Interpretation (Lexis Nexis, India, 12th Ed.) 3; Lord Simon explained the purposive approach in Maunsell v Olins [1975] AC 373 ('The first task of a court of construction is to put itself in the shoes of the draftsman – to consider what knowledge he had and, importantly, what statutory objective he had …being thus placed…the court proceeds to ascertain the meaning of the statutory language.’). 19 See Rivers State Government v Specialist Konsult (2005) 7 NWLR (Pt 923) 145; Elabanjo vs Dawodu (2006) 15 NWLR (Pt 1001) 76 at 138H. 20 E. Ekokoi Solomon. 2016. “The Basic Structure Doctrine and Implied Limitations on the Exercise of Legislative Powers Under the Nigerian Constitution” University of Uyo Law Journal Vol 9, 276 citing Senator Adesanya v President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, [1981] ANLR 1, 25 (SC); Awolowo v Sarki, [1966] 1 All NLR 178 (SC); J.F. Manning. 2009. “Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation.” Harvard Law Review. Vol. 122(8) 2004, 2007; James Madison, “The Federalist 40” in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay. 2008. The Federalist Papers (L. Goldman (ed), New York: Oxford University Press)194; V.C. Jackson. Constitutional Engagement in a Transnational Era (New York: Oxford University Press) 134-6. 21 Oshio P.E. “Towards a Purposive Approach to the Interpretation of the 1999 Constitution.” http://www.nigerianlawguru.com/articles/constitutional%20law/TOWARDS%20A%20PURPOSIVE%20APPROA CH%20TO%20THE%20INTERPRETATION%20OF%20THE%201999%20CONSTITUTION.pdf 22 Richard Scragg. 2009. New Zealand’s Legal System: The Principles of Legal Method (Melbourne: OUP, 2nd ed.,), chapters 4-5. grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament."23 The approach is the preferred approach for interpreting domestic legislations in most continental European countries, and when interpreting EU laws, European courts are required to apply the purposive approach.24 Lord Denning said in the English case of Nothman v. Barnet “[i]n all cases now in the interpretation of statutes we adopt such a construction as will “promote the general legislative purpose” underlying the provision.”25 In the 1993 case of Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v. Hart,26 Lord Griffiths pointed out that “The days have long passed when the Courts adopted a strict constructionist view of interpretation which required them to adopt the literal meaning of the language. The Courts must adopt a purposive approach which seeks to give effect to the true purpose of the legislation.” This purposive approach to constitutional interpretation also intersects the Harmonious Rule of Constitutional interpretation which enjoins the judges to interpret conflicting provisions of the constitution broadly and harmoniously, in order to make a consistent meaning out of the whole enactment.27 The Harmonious Rule requires that when there are conflicting provisions in the Constitution, it is the interpretation that gives effects to the overall purpose of the Constitution that will be preferred over the other that defeats it.28 Where it is impossible to reconcile the conflicting provisions, then the judge will strive to give effect to both provisions to avoid a situation where what the Parliament gives by one hand is taken away by the other hand.29 Ultimately, a judge should refrain from such interpretation whereby the meaning given to a provision undermines, defeats or cancels the purpose of the other provision.30 Adopting the Harmonious rule, the Indian Supreme Court has reconciled many of the conflicts between the country’s Fundamental rights and non-justiciable Directive Principles of the State Policy by holding that both are “supplementary and complementary to each other” and “[t]hey basically run parallel to each other and neither one is subordinate to the other.”31 In Sheikh Bishmillah v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors,32 the Indian Supreme Court held that “It is the Court's duty to give a harmonious construction to the directive principles and duties vice versa the fundamental rights.” When confronted with a conflict between the justiciable fundamental right to 23 [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, at para 21, per Elmer Driedger J, quoting E. A. Driedger, The Construction of Statutes (2nd ed 1983), at p. 87. 24 THE OPEN UNIVERSITY. The Purposive Approach, https://www.open.edu/openlearn/society-politics- law/judges-and-the-law/content-section-6.5; E-LAW RESOURCES, The Purposive Approach to Statutory Interpretation, https://e-lawresources.co.uk/Purposive-approach.php 25 (1978) 1 W.L.R. 220. 26 (1993) 1 ALL E.R.42 27 Dinesh Singh Chauhan. “Doctrine of Harmonious Construction in the Interpretation of Statutes.” Legal Service India, https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-6955-doctrine-of-harmonious-construction-in-the- interpretation-of-statutes.html. 28 Ibid. 29 Sultana Begum Vs Premchand Jain, AIR 1997 SC 1006 @ 1009-1010. 30 See the Indian Cases of Sri Shankari Prasad Singhh Deo Vs Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 458; Commissioner of Income Tax Vs Hindustan Bulk Carriers (2003) 3 SCC 57, P. 74 31 See Ashutosh Singh. 2022. “All About the Doctrine of Harmonious Construction.” https://blog.ipleaders.in/all- about-the-doctrine-of-harmonious-construction/ citing In Re: The Kerala Education Bill vs Unknown, 1959 1 SCR 995; Sri Shankari Prasad Singhh Deo Vs Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 458 and Qureshi v. State of Bihar [1958] INSC 46 32 (1994) JLJ 716 : (1994) 2 MPJR 111 : (1994) 39 MPLJ 224 : (1994) MPLJ 224 life and the right to a healthy environment in Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar,33 the Supreme court of Indian broadly interpreted the right to life to include the right to a healthy environment. That way, rather than expanding the conflicts between the two rights, the Court strengthened right to life while at the same time elevated the status of right to a healthy environment from non- justiciability to justiciability for the common good of all Indians. The lesson from the Indian Court is that when two or more provisions of the Constitution