IIARD International Institute of Academic Research and Development

IIARD INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BANKING AND FINANCE RESEARCH (IJBFR )

E-ISSN 2695-1886
P-ISSN 2672-4979
VOL. 4 NO. 2 2018

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Effect of Deposit Insurance Fund on the Safety of Bank Deposit in Nigeria

Ani U. Wilson (PhD) and Ogar, Anthony

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Abstract

This study is intended to examine the impact of deposit insurance fund partially covered on the safety of bank deposit in Nigeria. The study sourced secondary time series data from the Nigeria deposit insurance corporation annual reports and banking supervisory and stability reports. The study adopted the ex-post facto and exploratory designs used ordinary least squared technique to estimate the study’s model. The analysis of the study revealed a significant positive effect of deposit insurance fund on bank deposit in Nigeria. The study recommends that Nigeria deposit insurance corporation should monitor the fully coverage levels in compliance with international best practices in association with increased market drive for low value account customers in order improve the total deposit partially covered

keywords:

Deposit Insurance Fund, Commercial Bank Deposit Mobilization

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