Democratizing the Policy-Making Process in the Twenty-First Century Fast-Paced and Complex World

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Abstract
This paper examines the five-stage model of the policy-making process and how the process is democratised. In many contexts, the policy-making apparatus of political representation and expert administration—the very machinery developed over the past two centuries to govern well without requiring too much from citizens—exhibits certain acute failures. These failures can be addressed with mechanisms of citizen participation and deliberation. Belying the skeptical claim regarding the feasibility of participatory democracy, experiences in local governance have combined representative and participatory mechanisms in hybrid configurations that make government more responsive and just than either pure form. These experiences suggest that the historic antagonism between proponents of representative and participatory democracy confuses more than it illuminates. A contemporary, pragmatic challenge for democratic theory and practice is to identify the contexts in which received governance mechanisms exhibit serious and systematic democratic deficits, and then to devise appropriate institutional remedies. This paper pursues a part of that challenge by illuminating characteristic deficits of the conventional representative and professionalised policy-making process and then suggesting how novel combinations of representation and administration on one hand, and participation and deliberation on the other, can and in some cases have, addressed those deficits. This exploration surveys several of the ways in which participation and deliberation can address shortcomings of a minimal representative policy process. There are certainly other ways to address those shortcomings that do not involve popular participation; attention is focused here on the subset of solutions that deepen democratic engagement. Furthermore, important criticisms of participation and deliberation that claim, for example, that such processes exclude particular perspectives or interests, or that they reinforce patterns of domination and inequality, lie outside the scope of this treatment.

Keywords: *Policy, Policy-Making, Models, Democracy, Participation*

Introduction

Harold Lasswell, a pioneer in the field of policy research, first systematically proposed the idea that policy creation can be viewed as a sequence of steps in a decision-making process (Lasswell, 1966, 1981). A five-stage model of the policy process has been most frequently employed in recent work. According to this concept, "agenda-setting" is the opening phase of the process, during which policy players first recognise a problem and propose a number of potential remedies. The term "policy formulation" describes the process by which certain policy options are developed

inside the government after the number of viable possibilities is reduced by eliminating those that are impractical and different actors work to have their preferred option placed highly among the few that remain. The third stage of the process is called "decision-making," during which governments decide on a specific course of action; the fourth stage is called "policy implementation," during which governments use a combination of public administration tools to change the distribution of goods and services in society in a way that is generally compatible with the opinions and values of those who will be impacted; and the fifth stage is called "policy evaluation," during which state and societal actors monitor the results of policies, frequently rethinking policy problems and solutions in light of experiences with the policy in question (Howl et al., 2019).

This concept of policy-making as a series of interconnected steps offers a broad "framework" for comprehending the policy-making process and identifies a number of important temporal activities and connections that need to be looked at in order to further the issue's research. The actual content of the policy, the number and kind of pertinent actors involved in the process, and their motivations, the precise order and method of actual policy development processes, and the existence of fundamental patterns of development in various issue areas, sectors, or jurisdictions are some of the important questions that it fails to address (Sabatier, 2021). However, empirical studies that sought to answer these questions and produce more detailed models of the policy-making process have produced some knowledge about the actions of policy actors at each stage of the cycle, which is summed up in the following section. This highlights the few common modes, or styles, that define policy processes globally as well as the factors that propel policy-making through the different stages.

What part do citizen involvement and discussion play in contemporary policy-making and governance? Students of administration, politics, and policy have yet to reconcile the conflict between public voice and expertise in modern polities. For many, direct democracy is both undesirable and impractical. The public qualities of political participation have no unique place in contemporary values and ideas of the good life, which makes it undesirable. Although desired, it is not practical due to scale and complexity issues that exclude well-known forms of participatory democracy like the ancient Athenian *ekklesia* (Sinclair, 1998; Ober, 2021) and the New England town meeting (Bryan, 2022; Mansbridge, 1990).

Given that influence is the foundation of democracy, there are reasons to believe that the first assertion is overdrawn—that there are several situations in which contemporary individuals want more control over decisions that impact them or are made in their name (Pitkin & Shumer, 1992). However, this assertion is acknowledged arguendo in the pages that follow. The following assumes that the majority of people in contemporary industrial democracies do not value political engagement in and of itself. However, the instances covered below show that, given the motivation and chance, citizens do participate in significant numbers. However, involvement takes time and effort that could be better spent on personal goals and pleasures. The potentially extravagant expectations of participatory government should not overwhelm the efforts of citizens when public business may be assigned to a class of administrators and professional representatives who consistently serve their interests. However, the idea of an elite-led, responsive, and just government that serves the interests of the populace is as idealistic as full-fledged participatory democracy (Coh & Fu, 2022). In many situations, there are certain glaring shortcomings in the machinery of expert administration and political representation, which was created during the previous 200 years to effectively manage without needing excessive demands of the populace. Public engagement and deliberation techniques can be used to solve these shortcomings. Belying

the second skeptical claim regarding the feasibility of participatory democracy, experiences in local governance have combined representative and participatory mechanisms in hybrid configurations that make government more responsive and just than either pure form.
These encounters imply that rather than illuminating, the long-standing hostility between advocates of representational and participatory democracy confuses. Determining the situations in which acquired governing institutions display significant and persistent democratic deficiencies and then coming up with suitable institutional solutions is a current, realistic problem for democratic theory and practice. A portion of that challenge is pursued in this paper by highlighting the distinctive shortcomings of the traditional representative and professionalised policy-making process and then offering solutions for addressing those shortcomings through innovative combinations of administration and representation on the one hand, and participation and deliberation on the other. This investigation examines a number of ways that participation and deliberation can rectify the drawbacks of a minimally representative policy-making process. We concentrate here on the subset of solutions that increase democratic engagement, but there are undoubtedly other approaches to addressing those problems that do not entail public participation. Furthermore, this treatment does not address significant criticisms of participation and deliberation that assert, for instance, that these processes exclude specific viewpoints or interests or that they perpetuate patterns of inequality and dominance (Fraser, 2022; Sanders, 2020; Young, 2020).

Styles of Policy Behaviour in the Policy Cycle

Agenda-Setting

For instance, the academic literature on agenda-setting frequently makes a helpful difference between the institutional or formal, official agenda and the systemic or unofficial public agenda, which aids in conceptualising the dynamics of policy-making at this point in the process. "Every issue that is widely regarded by the political community as deserving of public attention and involving matters within the legitimate jurisdiction of existing governmental authority" (Cobb & Elder, 1982) is included in the systemic agenda. In essence, this is a society's agenda for talking about issues like health care, crime, water quality, and wilderness preservation.On the other hand, policy elites focus their attention on a small set of themes or concerns that make up the formal or institutional agenda (Baumgartner & Jones, 2021; Kingdon, 1994). There are literally hundreds of issues in any culture that some people find concerning and would like the government to address. Understanding how and why this movement takes place is crucial to comprehending process dynamics at the "front-end" of the policy process, as policy actors actively involved in policy formulation only take up a small percentage of the issues on the public or systemic agenda.
Based on this realisation, American political scientists Cobb, Ross, and Ross created a model of common agenda-setting styles over forty-five years ago. According to their analysis, there are three fundamental patterns of agenda-setting that can be identified based on the issue's genesis and the resources used to make it possible for it to be included on the agenda. "Problems originate in nongovernmental organisations and are then sufficiently broadened to reach, first, the public [systemic] agenda and, finally, the formal [institutional] agenda" (Cobb et al., 1976) is the pattern of outside initiation. "Decision-makers trying to expand an issue from a formal to a public agenda" is how the mobilisation case is described. Under this strategy, the government merely adds matters to the official agenda without requiring any prior development from a publicly acknowledged grievance. In the third kind of agenda-setting, known as "inside initiation," powerful organisations that have unique access to decision-makers start a policy without necessarily wanting it to be

broadened and debated in public. Both political and technical factors may be to blame for this. Due to the privileged position of individuals seeking a decision, entry is essentially automatic.
The timing of these agenda entrance processes was the subject of additional research by John Kingdon in the early 1990s on the dynamics of agenda-setting in the US Congress. His research centred on the function of policy entrepreneurs, both inside and outside the government, in utilising policy windows—opportunities for agenda-setting—to get topics on official government agendas (Kingdon, 1994). Kingdon maintained that opportunities for agenda entry are created and closed by the nature of issues (the problem stream), political institutions and conditions (the politics stream), and the formulation of policy solutions (the policy stream). Policy entrepreneurs who are able to identify and take advantage of such possibilities may choose to do so or not. Routine, spill-over, discretionary, and random policy window types are among those that may result in issue admission (Kingdon, 1994; Howl, 2023). The most institutionalised window types appear to occur far more frequently than the least institutionalised, according to empirical evidence, which also indicates that the frequency of occurrence varies by level of institutionalisation (Howl, 2023).

Policy Formulation

Research on the policy cycle's second stage, policy formulation, has also highlighted the significance of particular types of actors working together to create and improve government policy alternatives (Freeman, 1975; Linder & Peters, 2019) and the limited range of policy formulation styles that follow. The relevant policy actors are limited to those who not only have an opinion on a topic but also possess a minimal level of knowledge about the subject, enabling them to comment, at least hypothetically, on the viability of options proposed to address policy problems. This is in contrast to agenda-setting, where the public is frequently actively involved.

In recent years, studies of policy formulation have focused a lot of attention on the strength of these players' beliefs and their stability in policy subsystems. For instance, Carstensen (2021) proposed that ideas evolve gradually as new meanings are added to them, leading to a distinctive policy-making process wherein comparable concepts inspire similar policy options over an extended period of time. This causes the analysis to shift its focus to the ways that discourses within certain institutional settings influence the types of policy alternatives that are proposed during the policy development process (Schmidt, 2016, 2020, 2021). Policy research in this vein has focused on ideas like epistemic communities (ECs) in policy development because it emphasises the information or knowledge that decision-makers have access to. These loose associations of specialists or knowledge "providers" for the decision-making process create new avenues for influencing potential policy options. Their "ability to transfer policy by assuming control over knowledge production and in doing so guiding decision-maker learning" is the proposed mechanism that underlies this (Dunlop, 2019, p. 290; Haas, 2022).
To assist identify the main players in these policy subsystems, what unites them, how they interact, and how their interactions impact policy formulation, scholars have produced a number of such notions over the years (Jordan, 2019a, 2019b; Jordan & Schubert, 2022). In order to influence alternative formation, the majority of these distinguish between a large group of actors who possess some knowledge of the policy issue at hand, such as an epistemic community, and a smaller group of actors who not only possess the necessary knowledge but also have established patterns of more or less regular interactions with decision-makers and each other (Knoke, 2023).
Participants in knowledge-based policy communities include state policymakers (administrative, political, and judicial), members of NGOs that are interested in the subject, media outlets that

cover the subject, scholars who study or follow the subject, and members of the general public who have developed an interest in the subject for any reason (Sabatier, 1997, 2023). Members of various formalised interest groups or professional associations, businesses, labour unions, and other organisations that are concerned with government actions in the sector in question are also part of the policy community in many issue areas. A subset of these actors who interact within more formalised institutions and procedures of government are defined as members of policy networks (Coleman & Skogstad, 2019; Marin & Mayntz, 2021; Pross, 2022). These policy networks include representatives from the community, but are essentially "inner circles" of actors that have the power to veto many policy options as untenable or unfeasible. In certain cases, international actors, such as multinational corporations, international governmental organisations or non-governmental organisations, or the governments of foreign states, can also be members of sectoral policy communities (Haas, 2022).

According to this perspective, the character and structure of the policy community and network within the particular sector in question determine the expected outcomes of policy formulation. Numerous observers have contended that a crucial factor influencing the composition and conduct of policy networks is their membership count, which impacts the degree of integration and the kinds of interactions they engage in (van Waarden, 2022; Atkinson & Coleman, 1999, 2022; Coleman & Skogstad, 2019). On the other hand, the number of somewhat unique "idea sets" that exist within policy communities is more significant than the total number of members. This affects the nature of conflict and consensus which exists in the community and, as a result, affects the behaviour of community actors (Schulman, 1998; MacRae, 2023; Smith, 2023).

When combined, these configurations can create a style of policy development that is resistant to change and can be fairly durable. For instance, it may be anticipated that a tendency towards novel, radical alternatives to the status quo may be developed throughout the policy-making process in open ecosystems when networks have a large number of members and communities communicate a wide range of ideas. Conversely, in closed subsystems, when communities are dominated by a single set of ideas and networks have few members, a status quo orientation will show up in the policy options that are developed and presented to decision-makers. In subsystems where only a few actors make up the network but communities are open to new ideas, significant alternatives to the status quo may emerge from the formulation process, but usually over the opposition of network members. In subsystems where many actors deal with few ideas, marginal or incremental options tend to develop.

The network framework is useful because it offers a general mechanism to help organise the complex reality of multiple actors, institutions, and ideas found in the policy formulation process (Howl et al., 2019; Smith, 2020; Howl & Ram, 2023; Howl, 2012a). However, it has been criticised as a descriptive metaphor because "the independent variables, (of policy-making) are not network characteristics per se but rather characteristics of components within the networks" (Dowding, 2020, p. 137).

Decision-Making

When it comes to the policy-making stage, similar styles have been seen. For instance, a huge number of early studies on policy-making in businesses, governments, and organizations—mostly carried out by students of public and business administration—argued that decision-makers try to adhere to a methodical process for reaching rational, effective conclusions. They maintained that when policymakers first set a goal, looked at different ways to reach it, tried to forecast its outcomes and the chance that each would occur, and then selected the option that maximised

potential benefits at the lowest cost or risk, they were able to achieve better results (Gawthrop, 1981; Carley, 1990; Cahill & Overman, 2019).

Several recent attempts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public policy decision-making, like the "evidence-based policy movement" (Pawson, 2016), focus on applying a systemic evaluative rationality to policy problems (Sanderson, 2016; Mintrom, 2017). This model was "rational" in that it prescribed a standard set of procedures for policy-making that were expected to always result in the choice of the most efficient means of achieving policy goals (Jennings, 1997; Torgerson, 1996).

However, empirical research on decision-making processes has found that political bargaining and negotiation procedures frequently take precedence over "rational" considerations, and cost-benefit computations are subject to procedural and substantive restrictions. Other models of public policy decision-making processes have claimed that this is not an accidental condition but rather an inherent and unavoidable element of the policy-making activity. It has been frequently observed that policymakers are neither inherently neutral nor competent.

The American behavioural scientist Herbert Simon was arguably the most well-known opponent of the rational model of decision-making. He made the case in a number of books and papers starting in the early 1950s that a number of obstacles stood in the way of decision-makers reaching "pure" comprehensive rationality in their choices (Simon, 1965, 1967). Simon pointed out that decision-makers are forced to selectively assess alternatives because they have clear cognitive limitations that prevent them from considering every possibility. Based on his evaluation of the rational model, he came to the conclusion that public decisions in reality tended to meet whatever standards decision-makers set for themselves in the particular situation, rather than maximising benefits over costs.According to him, this "satisficing" requirement was reasonable in light of the "bounded rationality" that all people possess. This analysis noted that rational models would only produce optimal decisions in extremely narrow settings where complete information on options existed and could be mobilised by important decision-makers, but it did not rule out the employment of rationality-forcing approaches (Smith & May, 1990).

Charles Lindblom, a political scientist at Yale University, developed the well-known *incremental model* of policy-making, which integrated these insights into limited or "bounded" rationality into a general model of public policy decision-making (Dahl & Lindblom, 1953; Lindblom, 1955, 1958, 1959; Hayes, 2022). According to Lindblom, the components of his approach include the following "mutually supporting set of simplifying and focusing stratagems":

- limitation of analysis to a few somewhat familiar policy alternatives … differing only marginally from the status quo;
- an intertwining of analysis of policy goals and other values with the empirical aspects of the problem (that is, no requirement that values be specified first with means subsequently found to promote them);
- a greater analytical preoccupation with ills to be remedied than positive goals to be sought; a sequence of trials, errors, and revised trials;
- analysis that explores only some, not all, of the important possible consequences of a considered alternative;
- fragmentation of analytical work to many (partisan) participants in policy-making (each attending to their piece of the overall problem domain) (Lindblom, 1979).

According to his frequently cited 1959 article on "The Science of 'Muddling Through,'" this led to decision-makers working through a process of "continually building out from the current situation, step-by-step and by small degrees" or "increments," where policies were always developed through

a process of "successive limited comparisons" with earlier ones that decision-makers were already familiar with (Lindblom, 1959).

According to Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963), decision-makers' decision-making styles can be identified based on the quantity of information they have access to and how much the decision differs from past choices. Similar models of various decision-making styles were also created by other writers, such as Graham Allison (Allison, 1979, 1981), but they did not go into great detail about the factors that contributed to the adoption of a specific style (Bendor & Hammond, 2022).

In an effort to enhance these models, John Forester (1994, 1999) proposed that the number of agents involved in a decision, their organisational setting, the quality of the problem's definition, the information available on the problem, its causes, and its consequences, and the time available to decision-makers to contemplate potential contingencies and their current and expected consequences all influence decision-making. Nearly infinite expansion and multiplication of the number of agents is possible. Numerous organisations may be present, and the environment may be more or less susceptible to outside influences. The issue may be unclear or open to several conflicting interpretations. Time can be restricted or artificially confined and managed, and information can be deceptive, partial, or purposefully withheld or distorted. According to this model, decision-makers in complex subsystems are predicted to use adjustment techniques, whereas those working with basic actor and concept configurations are more likely to use search-type tactics. On the other hand, the degree of informational, temporal, and other resource restrictions that decision-makers must work under influences the type of criteria used in the decision-making process. Because of this, decision-makers with high constraints will typically choose satisficing over optimisation, which is a result that is more likely to happen in low constraint scenarios. In general, this would result in a pattern where the majority of decisions would be incremental, with the exception of some situations where different types of options might arise.

Policy Implementation Styles

Comparative implementation studies have generally also demonstrated that governments tend to create particular implementation styles (Knill, 2023; Hawkins & Thomas, 1999; Goo, 2020; Kagan, 2021; Howl, 2012b) that integrate different types of instruments into a more or less cohesive whole before applying it in specific sectors (Howl, 2021; Wuppy et al., 2020). Policy instruments, which are related to implementation, give the plan's substance or content what was decided upon later in the policy process's decision-making stage (Howl, 2021).

There are two categories for these tools. Instruments that directly supply the public or governments with goods and services are known as substantive instruments. Their success depends on many controlling resources (Tupper & Doern, 1991; Vedung, 2020; Woodside, 1996; Peters & Van Nispen, 2023; Salamon, 1999). Therefore, they comprise a range of tools or instruments. One helpful method to categorise these is by the kind of governing resource they depend on: information or nodality; financial, wealth, or authority resources; or administrative or organisational resources (Hood, 1996).

In contrast to substantive instruments, procedural ones have a less direct effect on policy results. Their main goal is to change the nature of policy procedures that are in place during the implementation phase, rather than having an impact on the supply of goods and services (Howl, 2020; Goo, 2020; in't Veld, 2023). Michael Howl provides a list of these instruments (2021, p. 154).

One important question is why specific policy issue areas use a given combination of substantive and procedural tools (Gunningham & Young, 2020; Dunsire, 2023; Howl, 2020; Salamon, 2012; Clark & Russell, 2019; McGoldrick & Boonn, 2020). It is possible to construct policy combinations, according to some studies. For instance, research on "smart regulation" by Gunningham, Grabosky, and Young sparked initiatives to find conflicts and complementaries in tool "portfolios" or instrument mixes used in more intricate and sophisticated policy designs (Barnett et al., 2019; Buckman & Diesendorf, 2020). Every tool mix selection weighs the benefits and drawbacks of each tool in relation to other tools, as well as how it affects government expenses and benefits (Howl, 2021).

Many studies have pointed to the importance of state decision-makers' preferences and the constraints they operate under in influencing the choice of instruments and the ways in which policies are implemented (Bressers & O'Toole, 2023). For instance, a state needs a high level of administrative capacity to use tools like authority, treasure, and organization-based instruments when it wants to influence a large number of policy targets; if it has few of these resources, it will likely use tools like incentives or propaganda, or rely on existing voluntary, community, or family-based instruments (Howl et al., 2019). Similarly, a government's ability to manipulate policy subsystems is a crucial aspect of procedural instrument choice. Undertaken in order to retain the political trust or legitimacy required for substantive policy instruments to be effective (Beetham, 2021; Stillman, 1984), procedural policy instrument choice is also affected by the size of the policy target. Whether a government faces sectoral delegitimation or widespread systemic delegitimation affects the types of procedural instruments a government will employ (Habermas, 1983, 1985; Mayntz, 1985).

Policy Evaluation Styles

The penultimate stage of the cycle is policy evaluation. For many early observers, policy evaluation was assumed to consist of analysing if a public policy was accomplishing its stated objectives and, if not, what could be done to minimise impediments to their fulfilment. "The objective, systematic, empirical examination of the effects ongoing policies and public programmes have on their targets in terms of the goals they are meant to achieve" is how David Nachmias (1989) described policy evaluation. But even while analysts frequently used terms like "success" or "failure" to wrap up their analysis, Ingram and Mann warned:

The phenomenon of policy failure is neither so simple nor certain as many contemporary critics of policy and politics would have us believe. Success and failure are slippery concepts, often highly subjective and reflective of an individual’s goals, perception of need, and perhaps even psychological disposition toward life (Ingram & Mann, 1990).

That is, public policy goals are often not stated clearly enough to find out if and to what extent they are being achieved, nor are they shared by all key policy actors. Moreover, the possibilities for objective analysis are also limited because of the difficulties involved in the attempt to develop objective standards by which to evaluate a government’s level of success in dealing with subjective claims and socially constructed problems.

That policy actors and the organisations and institutions they represent can gain knowledge from the official and informal evaluation of the policies they are involved in is therefore more important in the evaluation process than success or failure in the end. This may cause individuals to adjust their stances in favour of more significant substantive or procedural policy changes, or it may cause them to oppose any change to the current situation (Majone, 1999). Additionally, the

research on the topic has identified a few common or typical learning styles, just like with other stages of the policy process.

The ability of an organisation to take in new knowledge is a key factor in this respect (Coh & Levinthal, 2019). For example, one would anticipate learning to take place only when state administrative capability is great. This learning is probably limited to some kind of "lesson-drawing," where policymakers learn from previous use of policy tools, if a relatively closed network predominates in the subsystem (Rose, 2021; Bennett & Howl, 2022). When administrative capacity is high, open subsystems facilitate "social learning," but more informal evaluation is possible when adaptability is relatively low. When concepts and happenings in the broader policy community find their way into policy evaluations, this is known as "social learning." If the policy subsystem is dominated by closed networks, one would expect to find formal types of evaluation with little substantive impact on either policy instruments or goals and lesson-drawing attempts (Howl et al., 2019).

Significant policy changes are not always the outcome of policy reviews. In other words, even though the evaluation idea implies that an implicit "feedback loop" is a natural component of the policy cycle, this loop may not always be operationalised (Pierson, 2023). Path dependence can impede policy modification and learning when policies are put on "trajectories" after a "critical juncture" (Pierson, 2020). Organizational-institutional characteristics are frequently viewed as obstacles to policy evaluation learning (Eising, 2022; Olsen & Peters, 2018).

Democratic Deficits in the Policy Process

The following discussion is based on a highly stylised understanding of the policy-making process in capitalist democracies that links the interests of citizens to the results of government action. It is possible to refer to this plan as a minimal representative policy process because it does not allow for direct citizen input or discussion. This schematic representation is found in many introductory texts for students of politics and policy, despite the fact that its abstraction raises numerous significant questions. The variation found in Przeworki, Stokes, and Manin's volume on representation and accountability (2019) is used in Figure 1.1. Briefly, in this scheme, citizens have (1) interests and (2) preferences over policy options that they think will advance those interests. They (3) signal these preferences to government by voting in periodic elections for parties and politicians whose programmes most closely match their preferences. These electoral signals generate mandates for representative politicians to make (5) policies to advance these interests. Under the separation of powers between legislative and executive functions, (6) agencies staffed by professional administrators are charged with executing these policies, which generate (7) outcomes that advance the (1) interests that begin this process.

Election discipline is believed to establish two dynamics—representation and accountability—that guarantee the integrity of the relationship between the interests of citizens and the results of policy. Voting by prospective voters chooses the leaders they believe will represent them—those who will understand and support their preferences (2) by promoting suitable policies (5). In retrospect, the mandate that politicians run for office on a regular basis enables voters to penalise those who have not achieved sufficient results (7) by removing them from office (3) in favour of others who may do better. These dual mechanisms of representation and accountability may produce responsive and just government with only modest citizen participation in many domains of law and policy under favourable circumstances such as competitive elections, strong parties with clear platforms, vigorous public vetting of contentious policy alternatives, an informed electorate, sufficient insulation of state from economy, and a capable executive. For many public problems and under

less favourable conditions, however, this minimal institution of periodic elections fails to secure a level of political representation and accountability that makes government responsive.

Figure 1.1: The Minimal Representative Policy Process



Think about the four characteristic problems, or democratic deficits, that keep government from responding to elections. People's choices for the public policies that best serve their interests are not always evident when it comes to numerous public issues. Alternatively, their preferences are unstable, meaning they are susceptible to change when presented with new facts, viewpoints, or arguments (D1). The ensuing effects of political and policy decisions are based on extremely precarious foundations when popular preferences are neglected in these ways. Despite the high integrity of the rest of the executive and electoral apparatus, "garbage in produces garbage out." When people's preferences are consistent, election processes merely give politicians and political parties plain indications about what those preferences are about (D2). Politicians frequently misinterpret their voters if there isn't a deeper, ongoing contact between them than is offered by sporadic elections. The large range of topics that do not play a major role in political campaigns makes this type of misunderstanding particularly prevalent. Politicians cannot effectively represent their constituents if they do not understand them. Third, while voters have definite choices, electoral processes could not be strong enough to keep the political and administrative apparatus of government responsible (D3). Politicians' and administrators' interests may diverge from those of the majority of citizens on a number of official choices.When elections lack competition, when narrow interests conflict with diffuse ones, or when results are hard to track and evaluate, it is hard for voters to utilise elections to force politicians to act in the interests of the people rather than their elite purposes. The broad transfer of power and authority to administrative bodies in contemporary nations exacerbates accountability issues. Politicians may not be able to regulate and oversee the administrative machinery that carries out and frequently creates policy, even if citizens are able to hold them accountable. Lastly, the state itself may not be able to provide results that effectively further the interests of citizens, even in cases where electoral mechanisms of representation and accountability enable citizen-principals to exert influence over their political and administrative agents (D4). In areas such as economic development, for example, successful outcomes depend not only upon law and public policy, but also upon the actions of actors in the economic sphere. In areas such as environment, education, and public safety, outcomes depend upon engagement and contributions from individual citizens as well as public policy. These democratic deficits, and their positions in the policy process are depicted in Fig. 1.2.

Figure 1.2: Democratic Deficits in the Policy Process



In modern democracies, there are very extensive chains connecting the principals (people), actors (politicians and administrators), and results. In many situations, the four links mentioned above are especially weak. The next four parts outline how these deficiencies can be addressed through deliberative and participatory democratic processes. By adding direct participation and discourse to elections, some strategies aim to enhance the dynamics of preference creation, representation, and accountability. By making governmental action and agencies more directly responsive to citizens, some strategies aim to diminish the role of political representatives. Below is a reasonable and practical argument for participation and deliberation. We do not claim that directly democratic strategies are the only, or best way to address these democratic deficits. Rather, we aim only to articulate the ways in which they can make government more responsive to citizens' interests, and to show how they have been used to do so in actual cases. This analysis suggests that the optimal configurations of decision-making institutions will vary across policy domains, but in many cases should combine both representative and participatory mechanisms.

Deliberative Preference Articulation

Citizens may have stable and distinct policy preferences on issues where there are well-known, varied, and developed viewpoints in the public discourse, such as the distribution of wealth or the legalisation of abortion. Popular preferences may be ambiguous or unstable on many other issues—where one or a small number of viewpoints predominate, where misinformation is prevalent, when the issues are distant from the perceived interests, when it takes a significant amount of cognitive and informational resources to have a reasonable opinion, or when the issues just don't grab the attention of many citizens (see D1 in Fig. 1.2 above). When the foundations of policies are so erratic, it is hard to say that the people rule. On such matters, institutions that contribute to the development and stabilization of preferences by making them more clear, coherent, rational, and reasonable therefore deepen democracy and potentially make government more responsive to citizens' interests.

In democracies, the quality of the public sphere institutions—the media and secondary associations—that disseminate political viewpoints and discussions to the public greatly influences the quality of citizen choices. Beyond broad public sphere changes, which are outside the purview of this study, a number of creative initiatives seek to enhance the calibre of individuals' preferences by bringing groups of them together to discuss them with representatives, other public officials, and one another.

Deliberative Polling is among the most prominent of these. Its inventor James Fishkin describes the effort this way:

Select a national probability sample of the citizen voting age population and question them about some policy domain(s). Send them balanced, accessible briefing materials to help inform them and get them thinking more seriously about the same subject(s). Transport them to a single site, where

they can spend several days grappling with the issues, discussing them with one another in randomly assigned, moderated small groups and putting questions generated by the small group discussions to carefully balanced panels of policy experts and political leaders. At the end, question the participants again, using the same instruments as at the beginning (Luskin, Fishkin & Jowell, 2012).

According to Fishkin, these discussions frequently have a significant influence on the participants' viewpoints. For instance, respondents to a 2009 deliberative survey on crime in the UK were more empathetic towards criminal defendants and significantly less inclined to believe that severe penalties prevent crime (Luskin, Fishkin & Jowell, 2012). He displays comparable fluctuations in opinion for deliberative polls on topics like metropolitan government, energy utility policy, and Denmark's adoption of the euro. Participants may have adopted more rational, cogent, and informed perspectives as a result of their discussions with one another, which could explain these changes.

Note that when the phrase "deliberative democracy" refers to a process of social decision-making, "deliberative polling" is not in and of itself a type of deliberative democracy. Rather than, instance, just voting for solutions that best serve their interests, deliberative democracy is typically described as a system in which citizens make decisions collectively by presenting arguments that others can accept or possibly to shed light on conflicts. Participants in deliberative polling debate the merits of different viewpoints without making an attempt to come to an agreement or make a group decision. Its creators worry that by creating pressure to fit in, needing consensus might skew how people form their preferences. Perhaps Deliberative Polling is best adapted to address the unstable preference deficiency of many policy procedures because it does not involve communal decision-making.

A family of civic and policy interventions, including deliberative polling, brings people together to discuss issues in an attempt to influence public opinion and behaviour. Though their process designs vary, its siblings are all dedicated to involvement and discussion. For instance, citizen juries likewise utilise random selection, but they usually meet over several days as opposed to just one weekend and have smaller groupings than deliberative polls. Additionally, Citizen Juries release group conclusions and suggestions (Smith & Wales, 2020; Gastil, 2020; Leib, 2022). Through creative use of technology and facilitation, Twenty-First Century Town Meetings, created by an organisation called AmericaSpeaks, bring together thousands of residents and arrange discussions. Instead, they use open meetings and extensive recruiting from under-represented communities, doing away with random selection. Over the course of several months, the Topsfield Foundation sponsors Study Circles, which are community-wide discussions on particular topics. Only Deliberative Polling has pre- and post-deliberation surveys, thus nothing is known about how much participant preferences and opinions have changed in other methods. Even the meticulous study of Deliberative Polling has concentrated on the extent of opinion shifts rather than how they affect the consistency, stability, rationality, or reasonableness of preferences. Though these intentional projects in preference articulation are promising additions to electoral mechanisms, many dimensions of the micro-dynamics of political deliberation remain uncharted.

The general goal of initiatives like Citizen Juries and Deliberative Polling is to enhance the calibre of public opinion on matters that arise inside traditional institutions that make policy. In this sense, policymakers typically set the agenda for the topics they examine. A source of democratic concern, however, is the list of problems for which voters have expressed preferences and those for which they do not. Specifically, citizens are less inclined to express their views in areas they believe are beyond their control and more likely to do so in areas where they believe they have actual

alternatives. For instance, a lot of people who live in urban and suburban areas of America have very clear preferences about the type of neighbourhood they live in, the school their kids attend, the grocery store they choose, and other things. However, in other areas where results are crucial but rely on the decisions of distant agencies, developers, or others—for example, whether or not their neighbourhood has a park and how it is, the nature of the businesses in the area, or how the neighbourhood is related to its city or town—residents may have less distinct opinions while those other public and private actors have well-developed preferences. When the actions of those external forces become threatening—gentrification or the construction of ‘‘locally undesirable land uses’’ (LULUs) such as shelters for the homeless or hazardous waste facilities—reactionary ‘‘preferences’’ of rejection commonly emerge.

However, previous institutional decisions also impact the aspects of life that persons have power over, and hence the extent of their preferences. About sixty neighbourhood associations received $800 million as part of the Neighbourhood Revitalisation Programme (NRP), which was started by the city of Minneapolis, Minnesota, in 2015. Neighbourhood groups were required to create strategies, projects, and objectives in order to spend these funds, and many of them included many individuals in a deliberative process. In many communities, the necessity of planning and the tools available for effective planning prompted locals to establish much more distinct, occasionally mutual, preferences for the neighborhood's character. For instance, one neighbourhood organisation in Minneapolis created a thorough, expertly carried out, long-term plan for the community that included all significant facets of neighbourhood development. Deliberations around the use of NRP funds triggered the desire to articulate neighborhood preferences more clearly:

This area is undergoing major redevelopment right now. People wanted not just to react to proposals [for redevelopment] that will be coming down the pike. They wanted to have a professional set of guidelines that express what the neighbors want, so that when a developer comes along, hopefully at a very early stage before the developer gets too far along, we can hand them this master plan and say to him ‘‘this is what we’re looking for architecturally and with respect to land use, where we want the green space, where we want residential [units].’’ It gives a nice vision.

As many persons as feasible should be included in deliberative and participatory initiatives to help articulate popular desires. The fact that only a small percentage of pertinent constituents are directly involved in initiatives like neighbourhood groups and deliberative polling is a significant drawback. In all of these circumstances, the people who actively participate in deliberations—for which preference development may be rather profound—have only a fragile connection to other citizens and the wider public sphere, despite the fact that these activities all seek to involve others indirectly, such as through media coverage.

\Communicative Reauthorization

Representative government has been attacked by participatory democrats on the grounds that it frequently reduces the majority of citizens to the passive positions of subject and spectator. However, other democratic theorists contend that representation ought to be viewed as a partnership in which both professional politicians and citizens actively participate. It is incorrect to assume that those who are shown are submissive or under control. Plotke compares market representation to political representation. "My market representative has the authority to enter into specific agreements." I am therefore bound by what he or she does. I speak with my representative, and I have the ability to take their position. If x is a representation of y, then y is directing and

limiting x, allowing and approving him (Plotke, 2007, p. 28). Similarly, Iris Marion Young contends that "a representative process is better to the extent that it establishes and renews connections between constituents and representatives, as well as among members of the constituency, and worse, then, to the extent that the separation tends towards severance" (Young, 2020, p. 130). According to Jane Mansbridge, instead of following instructions from the previous election, political representatives frequently take action based on their expectations of the responses of their voters in the next one. She contends that such "anticipatory representation" functions best when elections are combined with reciprocal educational exchanges that allow voters to form their preferences and representatives to assess them (Mansbridge, 2013).

A contingent case for direct participation and deliberation is offered by these ideas of representation. Elections and campaigns send out very weak and sporadic indications about the interests and preferences of the populace (see D2 in Fig. 1.2 above). When significant choices are left to independent administrators rather to politicians, or when new issues emerge in between campaign seasons or when they are not widely relevant, elections are unable to provide the public with a voice. Participation and discussion before to and during elections can help to strengthen the bond between representatives and constituents when elections are unable to adequately express the opinions of the people.

In the US, focus groups, notice and comment procedures, public hearings, and polls are frequently used methods to determine public sentiment. These tactics frequently result in debates and discussions that don't evoke a deep sense of public mood and don't instruct either leaders or citizens. For instance, public meetings and hearings are usually set up to allow well-organised opposing sides to appear before decision makers without promoting communication (Kemmis, 2019). By utilising knowledge from disciplines like alternative dispute resolution, organisational design, and group process facilitation, deliberative practitioners in civil society organisations have addressed the limitations of deliberative and participatory approaches for re-establishing connections between constituents and representatives. In some cases, politicians and administrators have adopted their methods to create non-electoral, participatory, and deliberative mechanisms that inform and reauthorize their policy choices.

For instance, Kuna, a tiny municipality in Idaho, has implemented a policy procedure that is somewhat two-track. Representatives and administrators handle regular issues on the minimally participative electoral track without much citizen reauthorisation or contact. On topics that are likely to prove controversial and where public sentiment is unclear, officials and community organisations often organise a process called Study Circles, where citizens are invited to learn more about the issue and discuss the costs and benefits of different options with officials and each other over a period of several days. Participants in these events receive briefing materials and are arranged into small, assisted discussion groups, which is modelled after the national study circles concept. Members form opinions about the possibilities and issues at stake in smaller groups and in large group discussions that are made up of the entire population. They also prepare questions and suggestions for policymakers. These public discussions occasionally support the opinions of decision-makers and inspire community members to support particular policy stances. However, occasionally the discussions uncover hidden preferences and concerns that lead lawmakers and other officials to change their ideas. During their discussions with officials, citizens frequently learn to comprehend and value the arguments in favour of different plans and stances. These study circles are usually attended by one to several hundred inhabitants. Over the past five years, Kuna has convened study circles on issues ranging from multimillion-dollar school bonds to student drug testing, local tax policy, and town planning.

Rebuilding the lower Manhattan neighbourhood that was decimated in the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York City was another popular deliberative route (Kennedy School of Government, 2013). The task of spearheading the reconstruction of the World Trade Centre site fell to two regional organisations: the Port Authority and the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation (LMDC). However, it would be impossible for these agencies to meet these challenges through technocratic approaches alone due to multiple and conflicting goals and visions, such as commercial versus residential interests, speedy reconstruction versus deliberate and inclusive consultation, and the wishes of the families and friends for the victims to be appropriately honoured. The regional authorities consented to hold a number of extensive public talks over the site's future in conjunction with a number of civic organisations. The result of these public engagement initiatives was a sizable gathering known as "Listening to the City," which drew over 4,000 people to the Jacob Javitz Convention Centre in July 2012. AmericaSpeaks arranged the event using their "Twenty First Century Town Meeting" style. Hundreds of more private but targeted interactions were sparked by the event, as opposed to the traditional talking heads or public hearing format. There were five hundred tables with ten seats each on the conference center's main floor. A computer on each table was connected to a central bank of computers. Discussions from every table were shared with a central "theme team" throughout the day in an effort to identify reoccurring topics and points of view for the entire huge group. Each participant had their own "polling keypad," which was used to record straw polls and votes throughout the day in addition to capturing table conversations. Creating a method of public debate that combined the advantages of small-group discussion with the strength of large-group consensus was the goal of all this technology. In favour of bolder architecture, a memorial for the fallen, less focus on commercial priorities, and more consideration of affordability and the standard of residential life, this group unanimously rejected important aspects of the plans prepared by the LMDC and Port Authority. There was a lot of media coverage of the event, with nearly all of it being positive. There were 49 items in regional newspapers in the northeast and 18 in the *New York Times*. The two agencies were forced to start the planning process over and embrace many of the values and preferences expressed at "Listening to the City" due to a mix of public feedback and communication pressure from the media and civic organisations.

Popular Accountability

When professional representatives' interests consistently diverge from those of their constituents and when the electoral system is insufficient to force representatives to act in the interests of citizens rather than utilising political power for personal gain, the democratic policy process is even more seriously threatened (see D3 in Fig. 1.2 above). Perhaps the main obstacle to democratic institutional design is the issue of directing the political elites' energies towards the interests of the general public. Regular elections have only partially succeeded in addressing that difficulty in various social circumstances. Examine administrative delegation and political patronage ties as two prevalent and systemic barriers to electoral accountability.

Much of the work of contemporary government is handled by public agencies. Because it gives unelected individuals the ability to significantly influence policy, possibly in ways that disregard popular preferences, the expansion of these administrative agencies' size, complexity, and insulation "poses important problems in a democracy" (Dunn, 2019). In terms of information, capability, and energy, career administrators may have significant advantages over civic organisations and elected politicians (see Friedrich, 1940; Stewart, 1985; Lowi, 1989). Furthermore, these agencies may have agendas that diverge from the interests and preferences of

the general public since they are based on organisational needs or professional habits and speech (see Fischer, 2013; Hajer & Wagenaar, 2013). Reforms in administrative law, in particular the Administrative Procedures Act regulating federal rule making, create opportunities for affected parties to engage directly with federal agencies in ways that bypass structures of political representation (Stewart, 1985; Sunstein, 2019).

The problems of administrative delegation can be resolved by enhancing public accountability through participatory and deliberative forums where citizens interact with authorities and one another. This potential is demonstrated by the aforementioned "Listening to the City" case study of lower Manhattan reconstruction. The authorised public agencies established specific policy preferences during the rebuilding planning process that appeared to be tied to their organisational priorities. For instance, the Port Authority received income from the site's commercial activities, and it placed a strong emphasis on the restoration of commercial space in its orders to planners. The Port Authority's goals and initial plans did not address popular demands, if the outcomes of the discussions at the public involvement events in the summer of 2012 were indicative of broader emotions. While many public gatherings are ineffective in disciplining authorities, "Listening to the City" seems to hold these organisations accountable. Subsequently, the agencies modified the reconstruction parameters to accommodate the public preferences expressed during the event and held a public design competition. Because the participatory-deliberative event was a part of wider, widely publicised discussions concerning lower Manhattan in the media, it raised official accountability. All citizens were welcome to participate in the extensive conversation known as "Listening to the City," which had no carefully crafted agenda and was open to reporters. It was neither a news release from certain interest groups nor a report from a special agency. These participatory democratic features of the process endowed its conclusions with a distinctive legitimacy that journalists and their readers found highly compelling. Subsequently, agency officials and their political masters could not ignore them. Political elites could, however, avoid making the same mistake twice. They notably declined to sponsor similar events in later parts of the planning and reconstruction, and subsequent decision making was substantially less participatory.

In situations where public accountability is most at risk, "Listening to the City" shows how sporadic public discussion might support the current system of electoral-cum-administrative accountability. However, in more difficult situations, electoral processes serve to perpetuate and strengthen elite dominance rather than to check it; therefore, comprehensive changes of a tainted policy-making process are the only way to bring about popular accountability. This trajectory is demonstrated by the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre's experience with public participation in budget decisions (Baiocchi, 2013; Abers, 2020; Avritzer, 2012a). A platform of empowering the city's community and social movements helped the left-wing Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, or PT) gain the mayoralty in 1999. Through a very creative system known as the Participatory Budget (Orc¸amento Participativo, or OP), this pledge was turned into policy over the course of the following two years. In essence, the strategy transfers decision-making authority over the allocation of the city's capital budget from the city council to a network of popular assemblies at the local and city levels. To decide on local investment objectives, citizens and civic groupings convene through a convoluted yearly cycle of open meetings. The total city budget is the sum of these priorities. The elected city council is required to ratify the budget, but because of the immense legitimacy created by the annual popular process, ratification is essentially a formality. Since its inception, the OP's participation rate has increased significantly. By some estimates, some 10 per cent of the adult population participates in the formal and informal gatherings that constitute the

process. Furthermore, participants are drawn disproportionately from the poorer segments of the population.

Replacing a system of political patronage and clientelism with popular decision-making mechanisms that make public investments more responsive to the interests of citizens is one of the OP's key achievements. According to surveys, fewer civic leaders now acknowledge client-patron exchanges of perks for political support than they did before the OP (18%) (Baiocchi, 2015, pp. 45–46). Prior to the OP, 41% of associations obtained benefits by contacting politicians directly, according to another study by Leonardo Avritzer. However, none of these unmediated channels were used once the OP was established (Avritzer, 2012b). Reduced clientelism and increased political responsibility have substantial substantive effects. Because of the OP, Porto Alegre's impoverished citizens now have access to far better public goods and services. The percentage of neighborhoods with running water has increased from 75 to 98 per cent, sewer coverage has grown from 45 to 98 per cent, and the number of families offered housing assistance grew sixteen-fold since the initiation of the OP (Baiocchi, 2013).

It would seem like a drastic answer to the issue of electoral accountability to create participatory institutions that avoid the representative process. Such a lavish participatory reform might be out of proportion to the level of political accountability deficiencies it would solve in the great majority of cities in industrialised nations, where corruption and clientelism are the exception rather than the rule. Yet, comprehensive participatory reform might be a useful remedy in cases when patron-client interactions are extremely enduring, ingrained, and reinforcing dynamics of a policy-making process.

Alternative Governance and Public Problem-Solving Capacity

The incapacity of state tools to address specific types of public issues gives rise to a fourth characteristic weakness of the representative policy process (see D4 in Fig. 1.2 above). For certain types of issues that call for coordination and even collaboration with non-state actors, state-centered solutions are limited. In contrast to "government," some observers have created the term "governance" to refer to this decentering of public activity and decision-making outside the purview of official state institutions. For instance, addressing issues like children's education, public safety in violent neighbourhoods, and many social services necessitates not only the active consent of beneficiaries and other impacted citizens, but also occasionally constructive contributions (co-production) and even collaborative decision-making (co-governance). More generally, traditional top-down, state-centered mechanisms and methods have frequently failed to solve problems involving interdependent actors with varying interests, values, and experiences, such as many types of natural resource management and economic development problems (Booher & Innes, 2012). Furthermore, traditional state bureaucracies that organise themselves into distinct policy disciplines and assume a certain stability in their problem environments may find it impossible to handle some social problems due to their complexity, which stems from the multiplicity of causes that span conventional divisions of expertise, the volatility of their manifestations over time, or their diversity across space (Coh & Sab, 2020).

These restrictions on state capability can be overcome with the aid of direct participation and deliberation. Creating avenues for public decision-making participation can help address difficult public issues by leveraging the resources, ideas, and energies of stakeholders and citizens. According to Booher and Innes (2019), appropriate forms of discourse can lead to a quest for novel approaches and answers as well as normative pressure to reach just and reasonable conclusions as a group. We have previously referred to these measures as Empowered Participatory Governance.

To address specific, pressing issues, such changes encourage residents to consult with officials and one another (Fu & Wrig, 2013). One example of how Empowered Participatory Governance might increase group capabilities to address public issues is the changes made to the Chicago Police Department in the 2000s (Fu, 2014; Skogan et al., 2019; Skogan & Hartnett, 2020). The Chicago Police Department implemented a comprehensive approach to community policing in 2004. Residents and police officers meet monthly in each of the city's 280 neighbourhood police beats to discuss ways to improve neighbourhood safety. They determine which of the numerous local issues warrant special attention and develop plans to deal with them. Plans resulting from these neighbourhood discussions include inputs from other city departments, private organisations, and the public in addition to police action. Such cross-agency action and participatory problem solving represent a significant shift from conventional, hierarchical police techniques that have not been successful in addressing issues of persistent crime and disruption. In a variety of policy domains, including elementary and secondary education, environmental regulation, local economic development, neighbourhood planning, and natural resource management, comparable participatory and deliberative governance reforms have also surfaced (Weber, 2013; Sab, Fu & Karkkainen, 2020). Traditional regulatory or service delivery state bureaucracies encountered severe performance difficulties in each of these policy areas. Participatory and deliberative reforms that connected the unique capacities of stakeholders and citizens to governmental authority were used in some circumstances to overcome those problems.

Several major contrasts should be recognised, however, in the form of public participation and deliberation that tackles limitations of governmental capability. This fourth form of engagement is likely to demand more intensive, and consequently less comprehensive sorts of participation than public engagement to explain preferences, connect with officials, or occasionally bolster mechanisms of accountability. Residents and officials participate in in-depth planning and debates, frequently over long periods of time, in situations such as Chicago community policing. Deeply engaged citizens develop a degree of proficiency that allows them to communicate with professionals. It is not feasible to anticipate that a significant number of persons will make such a significant investment. Furthermore, the particular democratic deficit at issue here is public capacity rather than representation. In such cases, the involvement of a small percentage of citizens or stakeholders—whose involvement generates public goods for the rest—can often make a large difference with respect to problem-solving capacities. Similarly, deliberation in such cases often focuses more upon identifying and inventing effective courses of action rather than upon resolving deep-set conflicts of value that occupy much of the analysis of deliberation in democratic theory.

Conclusion

It is a helpful analytical and methodological tool to think of policy creation as a phased, sequential, and iterative process, as Harold Lasswell pointed out in the 1950s. By dividing the complexity of public policy-making into a limited number of phases and sub-parts, this methodological approach simplifies the process. Each stage can be examined independently or in relation to any or all of the other stages of the cycle. The concept of the policy cycle also aids in addressing a number of important issues pertaining to public policy-making, such as the efficiency of various instruments and the detection of process bottlenecks. By identifying the relatively small range of activity styles that are possible at each stage of the cycle, the stages facilitate the identification of typical actors and actions in various phases of problem-solving, which facilitates the identification of independent and dependent variables in the study of policy processes and behaviour (Freeman, 1995; Coleman, 2020; Tuohy, 2022; Vogel, 1996).

Should public decision making in modern democracies be organized in participatory and deliberative ways or though political representatives selected through periodic elections? The response in this paper is not definitive: it depends. It primarily depends on the type of public issue being addressed by a democratic process. Is that problem one on which citizens have informed and stable preferences, communication between representatives and constituents develops mutual knowledge, representatives' actions are aligned with citizen choices, and for which public bureaucracies provide appropriate capabilities? The bare democratic process of choosing representatives through elections may be enough to guarantee that the government responds to the interests of the people if all of these issues get positive answers. However, there are numerous more problems for which one or more of these requirements are not met. Institutions for public engagement and discourse can aid in mending these damaged ties in the minimally representative policy-making process. Instead, than considering participation and deliberation as substitutes for representation, it could be more productive to investigate which arrangements of institutions and processes best promote democratic goals like the state's responsiveness to different issues and political circumstances. A number of examples of such synergies have been provided in the pages above as a preliminary step to that more thorough investigation.

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